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2.1  Introduction 
In recent years, substantial changes in the pattern of fiscal positions 
of major industrial countries have occurred. From  1981 to 1985, for 
example, the fiscal deficit of the U.S. federal government is estimated 
to have risen by 2.8% of the U.S. GNP, while the deficits of central 
governments in the Federal Republic of  Germany and Japan, both of 
which have implemented medium-term fiscal restraint programs, de- 
clined by about 0.6% of their GNPs. A better measure of the underlying 
stance of policy, the fiscal impulse as a percent of GNP cumulated over 
the years 1981-85,  shows a shift in the United States toward expansion 
by 3% and contractionary  shifts of  1.9% in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and 0.8% in Japan (International Monetary Fund 1985, Ap- 
pendix table 15). It is widely acknowledged that this pattern of fiscal 
shifts is at least one of  the factors responsible for three important 
developments that have characterized the first five years of the present 
decade: the persistently high level of real interest rates in international 
financial markets, the rising current-account deficit of the United States 
and the surpluses of Japan and Germany, and the sustained appreciation 
in the real effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. 
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ment, International Monetary Fund. This paper was completed while he was an academic 
visitor at the Centre for Labour Economics, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, in 1985-86.  Paul R. Masson is a senior economist in the Research Department, 
International Monetary Fund. 
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those of the International Monetary Fund. We  are grateful to Charles Adams, Olivier 
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and several conference participants for helpful comments; and to David Hicks for re- 
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The purpose of this paper is to describe a very simple model that is 
consistent  with  all three of  these  stylized  facts and to specify and 
estimate a somewhat more sophisticated dynamic version of the model 
for the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and a 
highly aggregated rest-of-the-world sector. Simulation experiments are 
performed with the empirical model to see the effects of shifts in fiscal 
policy in major industrial countries on world interest rates and on the 
pattern of real exchange rates and current-account balances that evolves 
among them after the initial policy shock. 
In  order to isolate the  medium-term  patterns that  are our major 
interest, we abstract from the portfolio allocation decisions regarding 
stocks of domestic and foreign assets (Kouri and Porter 1974; Dorn- 
busch 1975; Girton and Henderson 1977; Branson, Halttunen, and Mas- 
son 1977) and concentrate instead on the intertemporal decisions that 
determine flows of domestic saving and capital accumulation. Of course, 
in a fully articulated macromodel the determinants of both portfolio 
allocation and saving-investment decisions would be derived consis- 
tently from a general maximizing framework. But we emphasize the 
intertemporal aspect because its role in the determination of exchange 
rates has received less attention in the literature and because, prima 
facie, the fiscal changes referred to above are likely to have resulted 
in major disturbances to national  saving and investment flows. Ob- 
viously, a model which concentrates on the underlying determinants 
of saving and investment in the largest industrial economies is unlikely 
to provide much insight into the causes of  day-to-day  or month-to- 
month fluctuations in market exchange rates. Nor does it indicate the 
effects of changes in fiscal policy in smaller countries. Nevertheless, 
such a model may serve to highlight how shifts in fiscal policy in the 
largest industrial economies influence private saving and investment 
behavior both at home and abroad, leading to changes in the level of 
world interest rates and in the pattern of real exchange rates and cur- 
rent-account positions that is sustainable over the medium term. 
The analysis of  current account and exchange rate movements in 
terms  of  saving and investment  behavior  has  a  long history  in  the 
literature, extending back to the classic work of Laursen and Metzler 
(1950).' Mundell (1963) discussed these interrelations in some detail, 
but his analysis was limited by the Keynesian assumption that saving 
responded only to movements in current income. More recently, fol- 
lowing the supply shocks of the 1970s, a number of writers (e.g., Dorn- 
busch and Fischer 1980, Sachs 1981) have emphasized the role of saving 
and investment decisions, and intertemporal choice generally, in de- 
termining the current-account positions that are sustainable over the 
medium term for industrial countries that can borrow or lend freely in 
an efficient world capital market. Svensson and Razin (1983) develop 23  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
models based on a rigorous analysis of  intertemporal behavior, and 
Sachs and Wyplosz (1984) study the effects of fiscal policy in a model 
that takes account of wealth accumulation and forward-looking expec- 
tations, but both of these analyses are restricted to the case of a small 
country facing a given world interest rate. Finally, Frenkel and Razin 
(1984, 1985a, 1985b) have integrated intertemporal decisions, fiscal pol- 
icy, interest rates, and terms-of-trade effects in a two-country frame- 
work that yields a large number of useful insights. The empirical model 
described later in this paper is in the spirit of these recent contributions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents 
a highly simplified theoretical model that illustrates how a change in 
fiscal policy in a large country can shift the world level of real interest 
rates and-via  its impact on private saving and investment decisions- 
alter the pattern of current accounts and real exchange rates. In section 
2.3 we specify and estimate a more realistic dynamic model for three 
major industrial countries. In this model, real exchange rates and in- 
terest rates are determined implicitly by conditions of market clearing. 
The model also allows for country-specific interest rates, cyclical ef- 
fects, and the possible neutrality of government debt. In section 2.4 
the model is closed to yield the full simultaneous system and the policy 
simulations are discussed. Section 2.5 provides a brief summary of the 
conclusions. 
2.2  A Simple Model of Government Deficits, the Current-Account 
Balance, and the Real Exchange Rate 
The starting point of our analysis is the proposition that if  there is 
a disturbance in  the domestic saving-investment balance of  a large 
industrial country that maintains a floating exchange rate, the equili- 
brating mechanism will alter the international allocation of net saving.* 
For example, unless an autonomous rise in a country’s fiscal deficit 
leads to a corresponding increase in private saving, that country will 
have to rely more heavily on saving from abroad (or on a reduction in 
the amount of domestic saving provided to the rest of  the world). In 
order for the increased saving from abroad to enter through the capital 
account, the current account must be pushed into deficit. The mech- 
anism by which the current-account deficit arises involves an appre- 
ciation of the real effective exchange rate and a loss of international 
competitiveness. Only in this way can the international capital transfer 
necessitated by  the disturbance in the saving-investment balance be 
“effected.” 
This relation between the real exchange rate, the current account, 
and the capital account has been widely discussed in recent years. For 
example, Henry C. Wallich (1983) observed: 24  Malcolm D. KnighUWul R. Masson 
In the United States . , . we do not have a current-account deficit 
because we need or even want it. We  have a current-account deficit 
mainly because we have a budget deficit. The mechanism by which 
the budget deficit causes the current-account deficit is straightfor- 
ward. The budget deficit raises interest rates. Higher interest rates, 
relative to foreign rates, cause a demand for dollar assets. The de- 
mand for dollar assets drives up the dollar exchange rate. The high 
dollar exchange rate causes the current-account deficit. Put differ- 
ently, we do not have a capital inflow because we have a current- 
account deficit. The causal sequence runs the other way. We  have a 
current-account deficit because we have a capital inflow. 
The purpose of this section is to derive a simple heuristic model where 
shifts in saving and investment, including government saving, produce 
the phenomenon that Wallich and others have described. For this pur- 
pose, it  is  convenient to use  a model  that  does not  depend  on an 
elaborate specification of the effects of fiscal policy on the level of real 
income3  and that avoids the complex issue of the effect of international 
interest rate differentials on exchange rates and capital flows. In ad- 
dition, we assume flexibility of goods prices, so that we can ignore the 
effects of changes in the level of the money supply on real magnitudes. 
The next section, however, presents an empirical model that addresses 
some of these complications and is dynamic in the sense that it accounts 
for accumulations of asset stocks and their feedback onto saving and 
investment flows. 
Consider a model of saving and investment behavior in a world of 
two large countries: the home country and the rest of the world, ROW 
(variables followed by  an asterisk). All  variables, including the ex- 
change rate and the interest rate, are defined in real terms, taking the 
price of domestic output as the numeraire. Flow variables, such as 
saving, investment and fiscal deficits, are all defined as ratios of each 
country's level of capacity output. The notation of the model is: 
E  The exchange rate (relative price of ROW output in terms 
of home-country output) 
R  The world real interest rate 
S,  S'  Flows of private sector saving in the home country and the 
rest of the world, respectively 
I, I*  Private sector fixed capital formation in the home country 
and the rest of the world 
N,  N*  The current-account balance of the home country and the 
rest of the world, (surplus =  +) 
D,  D'  Public sector fiscal deficit in the home country and the rest 
of the world 
aF 
ax 
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Both private investment and government fiscal deficits are financed 
by the issue of one-period bonds, and all bonds are viewed as perfect 
substitutes by private savers. To  further simplify the analysis of this 
section, we assume that market participants expect that the current 
real exchange rate will persist in the f~ture.~  These assumptions ensure 
that there is a fully integrated world credit market with a single real 
interest rate, R.’ 
Ex ante saving and investment, expressed as ratios of capacity out- 
put, are both assumed to depend on the real interest rate. Because of 
adjustment costs, real private net investment exhibits lagged adjust- 
ment to an optimal capital stock, which in turn depends on the user 
cost of capital (Gould 1968). Saving is taken here to result from indi- 
viduals’ intertemporal  optimization  of  the  utility from  consumption 
(Mussa 1976). For a given rate of time preference and expected future 
wage income, higher real interest rates will  decrease consumption. A 
rise in the real interest rate, however, may either raise or lower real 
private saving, since current income is increased for households holding 
positive net claims. Hence the sign of the partial derivative of saving 
with respect to R is ambiguous. We  impose the weaker restriction that 
if  intended saving declines when the interest rate rises, it falls by less 
than intended investment. 
A crucial question for the analysis of fiscal policy is the extent to 
which the government bonds issued to finance a fiscal deficit are viewed 
by the private sector as part of its net wealth. The Ricardo-Barro debt 
neutrality hypothesis asserts that if individuals and firms anticipate that 
the government will raise taxes in the future to finance the debt service 
on the bonds, and that they or their descendants will have to pay those 
taxes eventually, then there may be little  or no difference between 
financing government spending through tax increases or bond issues 
(Barro 1974; Carmichael 1982). In the extreme case where individuals 
are fully rational, can borrow and lend in perfect capital markets, and 
value their descendants’ consumption as highly as their own, bonds 
issued by the home government are not properly treated as a component 
of the private sector’s net wealth, which will consist only of the capital 
stock and net claims on foreign residents. In this case a rise in the fiscal 
deficit (i.e., an increase in public sector dissaving) would be exactly 
offset by a higher flow of  saving by the private sector. Holdings of 
bonds issued by foreign governments would  still be  part of  wealth 
because the taxes to service them are levied on foreign residents.6 
Most economists would now concede that changes in public sector 
saving are likely to be at least partially offset by alterations in private 
saving behavior. There are, however, a number of reasons for expecting 
that, in practice, households would not make a full offset of any change 
in their holdings of  bonds to take account of future taxes: they may 
think that they can avoid these taxes, they may  not value their de- 26  Malcolm D. KnighUPaul R.  Masson 
scendants’ welfare  equally  with  their own, and  they  certainly face 
significant capital market imperfections (see Buiter and Tobin 1979 for 
a more complete discussion). 
One way of modeling the lack of full offset is to stipulate that the 
private sector has a higher discount rate than the borrowing govern- 
ment; for instance, a fixed probability of death p will cause the private 
sector’s discount rate to be higher than the government’s by that amount 
(Blanchard 1985). In Blanchard’s model, private consumption depends 
on the sum of financial wealth and the discounted present value (using 
discount rate r + p) of future wage income net of taxes. The govern- 
ment, on the other hand, faces an intertemporal budget constraint in 
which future taxes are discounted at rate r: given a path for government 
spending, higher initial levels of government debt must be offset by 
higher future taxes, discounted at rate r. This budget constraint can be 
used to calculate a net financial wealth variable, which deducts from 
private sector holdings of government bonds the discounted value of 
future taxes relevant to households alive today. If taxes and real interest 
rates are expected to remain constant in the future, then the proportion 
of  government bond  holdings that  is  considered  net  wealth  by  the 
private sector will be unity minus the ratio of the government discount 
rate to the private sector’s. We  will call this proportion 4; it should lie 
between zero and unit.’ A value of 4 < 1 implies that the private sector 
only treats a corresponding fraction of its acquisition of government 
debt as an increment to its net worth, with the rest reflecting the present 
discounted value of future tax liabilities. 
Measured private saving equals the private sector’s total net asset 
accumulation, including its acquisition of government debt. Thus, total 
private saving S equals the change in private net wealth plus (1 - +) 
times the government deficit D (i.e., the increase in the outstanding 
stock of government debt): 
(1) 
where  S(R) is  the (interest-sensitive) component  of  saving that the 
private sector undertakes in order to accumulate wealth, and (1 - +)D 
is  the  component reflecting the private  sector’s response  to public 
sector dissaving. 
It is assumed that  since net exports of goods and services N  (the 
current-account surplus) respond to the price of the home good relative 
to the foreign good, the home country’s current account tends toward 
deficit when its currency appreciates in real terms (E falls) and vice 
versa when the home currency depreciates. The response of the current 
account balance to the real exchange rate embodies expenditure switch- 
ing by both home and foreign consumers: a rise in the relative price 
of domestic output leads to lower demand for home goods by both 
foreigners and domestic residents.* 
s = S(R) + (1 -  +)D 27  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
Macroeconomic equilibrium in the home country occurs when  ex 
ante private saving minus private domestic investment and the gov- 
ernment’s fiscal deficit equal the current-account surplus: 
(2)  S -  Z(R) - D = N(E). 
Substituting (1) into (2) yields the following modification of the equi- 
librium ~ondition:~ 
(3)  S(R) - Z(R) -  +D =  N(E). 
The restrictions on the partial derivatives of the behavioral functions 
of equation (3) are: 
N,>O  ZR<O  (SR-ZR)>O  lr+rO. 
An analogous saving-investment equilibrium holds for the rest of the 
world: 
(4)  S*(R) -  I*(R) - +*D*  = N*(E) 
with the restrictions 
IR* < 0  (Si -  1;)  > 0  1  ’+*  0s 
Equations (1) and (2) clearly do not constitute two independent con- 
ditions for macroeconomic equilibrium. This is because, in a two-country 
world, the home country’s current-account surplus must equal the def- 
icit of the rest of the world, so that 
(5)  N(E)  =  -N(E). 
This identity serves to emphasize the fact, already noted above, that 
the partial derivative N. subsumes the responses of both home-country 
and rest-of-the-world  residents to changes in  international competi- 
tiveness. Finally, assuming a ‘pure’ float, real private capital transfers 
from the rest of the world to the home country (i.e., the use of foreign 
savings by the home country) must always equal N. 
The simple model (3)-(5)  determines three endogenous variables: the 
world real interest rate, R; the real exchange rate, E;  and the current 
account balance, N = -W,  prevailing between the home country and 
the rest  of the world.  The only exogenous variables are the public 
sector fiscal deficits at home and abroad, D  and D*. 
The total differential of the system (3H5)  is: 
The determinant of the coefficient matrix, A, is 
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which, given our assumptions about the partial derivatives, is unam- 
biguously positive. 
Suppose that, starting from a balanced current-account position, the 
government of either the home country or the foreign country increases 
its fiscal deficit by some amount dD.  The system (6)  gives the following 
effects on the endogenous variables: 
dR  >  -  (8)  -  - - 
dD  A 
Assuming that the  private  sector treats  some fraction (+ > 0)  of 
domestic government bonds as a component of its net worth, an in- 
crease in  the home country's  fiscal deficit, dD, will  raise the world 
interest rate, cause the domestic currency to appreciate in real terms, 
and induce a deterioration of the home country's current-account bal- 
ance, financed by a transfer of capital from the rest of the world. These 
results have a simple intuitive rationale. When an increase in the home 
country's  public sector budget  deficit disturbs the domestic saving- 
investment balance, the excess demand for saving must be financed by 
an inflow of capital from the rest of the world. In order for this capital 
transfer to be affected, the home country's current account must move 
into deficit, and this movement is accomplished by a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency in  the foreign exchange market. However, 
other things equal an increase in public sector dissaving by the home 
country creates an imbalance between global saving and investment, 
necessitating a rise in the world real interest rate to restore equilibrium.'O 
Analogous results hold for the case of an increase of the public sector 
fiscal deficit, dD*, in the rest of the world: provided  +*  > 0, a more 
expansionary fiscal policy in the rest of  the world will also raise the 
world interest rate but will cause the home currency to depreciate and 
induce a current-account movement in the opposite direction to that 
referred to above." 
It  should be reiterated, however,  that these results hold for fiscal 
shifts in each country only if the relevant value of + # 0, implying that 
full Ricardian equivalence does not hold.  In general, the value of + 
depends, among other things, on the life expectancies of households 
(Blanchard 1985) and on private sector expectations about the specific 
types of future tax and spending measures that the government will 
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the values of 4 may differ significantly, not only across countries but 
over time, as views change about likely future fiscal policies. 
The implications of the preceding analysis for the world real interest 
rate and the real exchange rate between the two countries are illustrated 
in  figure 2.1.  In the figure, the vertical axis is  the real price of the 
currency of the rest of the world in terms of home currency, while the 
horizontal axis is the world real interest rate. The SZ curve is the locus 
of  combinations of the interest rate and the real exchange rate which, 
for given  public  sector fiscal  positions,  equates the  ex ante home- 
country private saving and investment balance with the ex  ante current- 
account balance. This curve slopes upward on our assumption that a 
rise in the interest rate causes desired investment to fall relative  to 
intended  saving, leading to an improvement  in  the home  country’s 
current-account balance in real terms. Such an improvement requires 
a depreciation of the home currency (a rise in E) to equate the ex ante 
current-account balance to the new desired pattern of  saving and in- 
vestment.  For  analogous  reasons,  the  rest-of-the-world’s  saving- 
investment balance curve, SI*,  slopes downward in E-R space. 
The nature of the interest rate and exchange rate movements that 
result from an autonomous shift in one country’s fiscal position will 
obviously depend on the responsiveness of  the real interest rate and 
exchange rate to a disturbance in the world market for saving, or to a 
disequilibrium in  the world goods market.  Figure  2.1  illustrates the 
effect of an expansionary fiscal policy in the home country. An increase 
in the home country fiscal deficit must shift the SZ curve to the right: 
at a given exchange rate and current account the increased demand for 
private  saving can only be brought about through a rise in  the real 
I  I  I 
Fig. 2.1 
0  R,  R,  R 
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interest rate which “crowds out” private investment relative to desired 
saving. The new equilibrium, B, will involve a real appreciation of the 
home currency and a higher world interest rate, Not described is the 
nature of the path to equilibrium. If there is lagged adjustment of trade 
flows to real exchange rates, or if saving and investment flows embody 
gradual movements toward desired stocks of wealth and physical cap- 
ital, respectively, then the dynamic adjustment path of the real interest 
rate to R,  and the real exchange rate to E, in response to a fiscal policy 
change are likely to be quite complex. The issue of  the path of ad- 
justment after a fiscal shock is clearly an important empirical question, 
and it will be considered at greater length in section 2.4. 
2.3  An Empirical Model for the United States, the Federal Republic 
of  Germany, and Japan 
The model described in the preceding section is too simple to capture 
such real-world complications as cyclical  variations (which tend to 
cause common movements in the historical data), or the accumulation 
of real and financial assets resulting from flows of net saving, invest- 
ment, and payments to foreigners. A more fully specified model would 
also ensure that in the steady state asset supplies and demands are 
equilibrated  and  that  each outstanding  stock  settles down to some 
proportion of output. Finally, to be useful as an explanation of recent 
developments in exchange rates and current-account balances the model 
should be extended to a multi-country context. In this section we spec- 
ify and estimate a model that takes account of these complexities. 
The empirical model includes equations for private saving, private 
investment, and the non-oil merchandise exports and imports of the 
United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. The rest 
of the world is captured in a rudimentary way through an aggregate 
function explaining total ROW saving minus investment. For each of 
the three  countries there are equations linking fiscal deficits to the 
increase in outstanding government debt, net investment to the change 
in  the  real  capital  stock, and imports  and exports-via  an identity 
equating the current balance to net merchandise exports plus the bal- 
ance on services-to  the change in claims on foreigners. In addition, 
the model implicitly determines the level of the real effective exchange 
rate of each of the three countries as the rate that makes the supply 
of private saving, minus the demands for saving from net private do- 
mestic investment and the government deficit, equal to net exports. 
(The real effective exchange rate of the remaining countries as a group 
is thus residually determined, as are its net exports.) The model retains 
the assumption of a single integrated world capital market with perfect 
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However, to the extent that the real bilateral value of  the U.S. dollar 
is expected to depreciate (appreciate) in terms of  the deutsche mark 
and the yen, real interest rates in Germany and Japan will be lower 
(higher) than the rate in the United States by  an amount equal to the 
expected rate of dollar depreciation (appreciation). 
2.3.1  Specification 
We  now  set out the structural equations for each country in  the 
model. In what follows, the subscript i is incremented over the list of 
countries (US,  GE, JA) unless otherwise noted. 
Our model is similar in spirit to that of Metzler (1951)  in focusing on 
the interaction of  saving and wealth. It also resembles a more recent 
theoretical model (Dornbusch 1975), though it ignores portfolio balance 
considerations treated there. We  assume that private saving adjusts to 
close the gap between the private sector’s desired wealth and its actual 
holdings at the beginning of  each period. Desired wealth is a function 
of the domestic real interest rate and permanent income (here proxied 
by  the current level of  income). Consistently with the model of  the 
preceding section (and also to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity and 
spurious correlations among trended variables) we deflate real private 
saving and real wealth in each country by a measure of capacity output 
(see Appendix for the sources of  data). The income variable, which 
appears in the equation because it helps to explain target wealth, there- 
fore has the form of  a gap between actual and capacity output (see 
Artus 1977  for methodology). 
Given the stringency of the assumptions (discussed in the preceding 
section)  that are required in order for autonomous shifts in public sector 
saving to be fully offset by induced movements in private saving, we 
treat  the  validity of  Ricardo-Barro debt neutrality as essentially an 
empirical hypothesis to be decided by  the data. Thus our empirical 
model retains the assumption that the private sector’s perceived net 
wealth may include any proportion + of  government debt, with + to 
be dictated by the data. 
The equation for private saving in  each country, i,  embodies the 
hypothesis that the change in private sector real wealth, as a pro- 
portion of  capacity  output,  YCj, is  equal  to a fraction of  the  gap 
between the private sector’s end-of-period target real wealth, W,*,  and 
lagged wealth, 
A( WJYC,) = ai[W;/YCi - Wj(  -  l)/YCi(  -  l)]  where Wl? = W,T( Y&), 
that is, target wealth is a function of  domestic real income and the 
domestic real interest rate. Wealth is composed of  some proportion, 
+i,  of  the real stock of  government debt, Bj,  plus the real net capital 
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Wj 2  +,Bj  + Kj  + F;. 
In the empirical model we retain the assumption of section 2.2 that 
there is a single world capital market, but we no longer impose the 
assumption of static expectations of the real exchange rate. The real 
interest rate on (private and government) bonds valued in units of U.S. 
output is R,.  However, since the real value of  the U.S. dollar can 
change in terms of the other two currencies over the holding period, 
real interest rates in Germany and Japan are given by: 
R; = Rus -  ERDOT,  i = GE, JA 
where ERDOT, is the market’s anticipated rate of  appreciation in the 
real exchange rate of currency i vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar.I3 
Saving data are calculated  such that private  saving equals the dif- 
ference between  after-tax disposable income and consumption-that 
is, the private sector’s acquisition of assets including government debt. 
Thus, based on the arguments of section 2.2 above, we define private 
saving as the change in net wealth plus (1 - +) times the real govern- 
ment deficit (DEE equal to 0): 
Sj  = AWj +  (1 - +j)DEFj. 
This is the specification of the flow of private saving that is required 
for consistency with the equation that defines the stock of private sector 
wealth (above). It emphasizes that if  households are rational, not all 
of private saving serves the purpose of acquiring net wealth; individuals 
increase their saving by some fraction (1 - +) of the government deficit 
in order to accumulate the assets needed to pay future taxes that will 
be levied by the government to service the additional debt. Combining 
this identity with the wealth adjustment equation given above, we obtain 
Sj/YCj = aj[W;/YCj - Wj(- l)/YCj(- I)]  + (1 - +;)DEF;/YCj 
+ (n/(l  + nj))Wj( -  I)/YCj( -  1) 
where n is the growth rate of capacity output. After substituting for W 
and W*  and grouping terms, the equation that is to be estimated takes 
the form 
(9)  S;/YC;  = 60, + bljR; + b2;GAP; + b3i[+jBj( -  1) + Kj(- 1) 
+ F;( -  l)]/YCj(  -  I) + (1  -+i)DEFj/YCj 
where 63; = (n/(l + n;) - ai) and bO;, bl;,  and b2i depend on the W 
function as well as the speed of adjustment q.  GAP is defined as the 
ratio of actual to capacity output, minus unity: GAP = Y/YC - 1. 
The current-account balance, which is the difference between total 
national saving (Si -  DEF,) and private investment, is given by: 
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Combining the three preceding equations it is clear that if Ricardian 
equivalence holds (Barro 1974), the C+ = 0 and private saving increases 
one-for-one with the government deficit, leaving (public plus private) 
net national saving unchanged. In this case the current-account balance 
would also be unaffected by changes in fiscal policy, provided, of course, 
that investment (considered below) was not directly affected. In the 
other polar case, C+ = 1, all of the increased government debt would 
be considered part of private net wealth, so that there would be no 
automatic increase in private saving to allow for future tax liabilities. 
Here the current-account  balance  would change by  an amount that 
would  depend  on  endogenous movements in  interest  rates  and ex- 
change rates. Of  course, our model also admits of  intermediate cases 
where 0 < 4 < 1 ;  in these cases full Ricardian equivalence would not 
hold, and there would be some direct, but incomplete, positive response 
of private saving to increases in government deficits. 
The investment equation assumes lagged adjustment of the real (net) 
capital stock divided by capacity output, where the desired capital stock 
depends on expected output and the domestic real interest rate, and 
expected output is assumed to be equal to actual output: 
A(Kj/YCj) = cj[KI*/YCj  -  Kj( -  l)/YCj( -  l)] 
where K; = Kl:(  Yi,  RJ.  The equation has the familiar accelerator prop- 
erty: an increase in output, relative to capacity output, tends to increase 
investment. We  assume that the K* function is homogeneous in  Y, and 
we write the investment equation in  terms of the output gap. After 
grouping terms, the estimating equation takes the form: 
(10)  ZjIYCj  =fOj + fljRj + f2jGAPj + f3jK,(-l)/YCi(-I) 
wheref3,  = (n/(l + ni) - ci). 
The equations that determine flows of merchandise trade are modeled 
in  a manner similar to those of the IMF’s World Trade Model (see 
Spencer 1984 for the latest version of that model). Non-oil merchandise 
export volumes, XV, are assumed to depend on foreign demand, here 
proxied by the foreign output gap, GAPF = YF/YCF - 1, and on the 
real effective exchange rate, REEX (defined as the ratio of normalized 
unit labor costs in the home country to those in foreign countries, so 
an increase in REEX  indicates a real appreciation). In addition, the 
ratio of exports to the home country’s capacity output, YC, may vary 
with a time trend (T), for instance, as a result of a gradual expansion 
of trade flows, relative to output, over the post-World  War I1 period. 
Non-oil merchandise import volumes, MV, are assumed to depend on 
the country’s output gap and its real effective exchange rate and again 
may exhibit a time trend when divided by capacity output. In addition, 
we allow for slow adjustment of volumes to activity and exchange rate 
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(11)  XVj/YCj  = goj + gljT + g2,GAPFj + g3,REEXj 
+ g4,XV,( -  l)IYCj( -  1); 
+ h4jMVj( -  l)/YCj( -  1). 
(12)  MVjIYCj = hOi  + hljT  + h2jGAPj  + h3iREEXj 
Finally, we  also include  in  the model an equation explaining the 
aggregate saving (minus investment) of the rest of the world.  In the 
absence  of  data on  the fiscal positions and wealth  stocks of  those 
countries, we simply make this net saving variable (also equal to the 
current-account position of the rest of the world, CAROW) a function 
of  their  real  interest  rate  (RROW), proxied  by  an average of  rates 
prevailing in the United States, Germany, and Japan: 
(13)  CAROWIYCROW  = ko + k,  RROW 
Equations (9H13)  above constitute the model that is to be estimated. 
Data sources are described in the Appendix, but some explanation here 
is warranted. The basic data for saving, investment, and current-account 
flows are at an annual frequency and come from the national accounts 
of  the country concerned. Data on asset stocks are cumulated from 
these flow data using whatever information is available concerning a 
benchmark stock figure. The capital stock is just the cumulation of the 
flow of net private real investment. As for the real value of government 
debt, a correction has been made to national accounts fiscal deficits 
for the portion of  nominal interest payments that corresponds to com- 
pensation for inflation (see Jump 1980). The calculation was performed 
in the following fashion: nominal deficits were cumulated from a bench- 
mark stock for government debt, and this series was deflated by the 
GDP deflator to get the real debt stock. The adjusted real deficit was 
defined as the first difference of this stock. A similar correction could 
be made to the published current-account balance (Sachs 1981), but it 
is clear that flows of investment income do not correspond solely to 
payments of interest on financial assets fixed in nominal terms. Also 
included are dividends on shares and earnings from foreign investment. 
In the absence of detailed data on the nature of the claims acquired, 
we assumed that all claims on foreigners correspond to real claims, 
and no correction was made to the current account. Real net claims 
on foreigners were simply calculated as the sum of past real current- 
account surpluses. Finally, real net private sector saving was calculated 
residually, in order to make it consistent with the other flow data, as 
the sum of the real current balance, real net private investment, and 
the corrected real government deficit. It thus embodies a partial cor- 
rection for inflation, to the extent that assets acquired take the form 
of claims on government. 35  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
2.3.2  Estimation 
The equations for each country were estimated over the longest time 
period for which annual data were available, in most cases from 1961 
to 1983. The equations were estimated in blocks using nonlinear three- 
stage least squares. Since real interest rates, real exchange rates, and 
output gaps are endogenous to the full model, they were not treated 
as being predetermined in each block; instruments used included the 
lagged asset stocks, government deficits, and capacity output. Saving 
and investment equations were estimated jointly for the three countries, 
along with the net saving function for the rest of the world. Estimates 
are presented  in  table 2.1. Import  and  export  equations were  also 
estimated jointly for the three countries; results are reported in table 
2.2.  Joint estimation by blocks allowed appropriate restrictions, dis- 
cussed below, to be imposed across equations. It also permitted effi- 
ciency gains by allowing for correlation among the shocks facing the 
same sectors in different countries. Joint estimation of all the equations 
together was not feasible owing to computer limitations. 
In this preliminary analysis, two assumptions were employed in the 
estimation and simulation work. The saving equation for each country 
embodies a nonlinear restriction on the coefficients, since + appears 
in both the definition of wealth and the coefficient applied to the budget 
deficit. We initially estimated + separately for each country. In all three 
cases its value was significantly different from zero, indicating that full 
Ricardian equivalence (and thus debt neutrality) does not hold. Further, 
the unrestricted  estimate yielded a lower value of + for the United 
States (0.25) than for Germany and Japan (about 0.6). 
Of course, one would expect +  to differ not only over time but across 
countries, because individual households form expectations about the 
specific types of tax and spending measures that their government is 
most likely to implement in altering its fiscal position. Each household 
can then form views about whether, for example, an expected reduction 
in public consumption is a close substitute for its own expenditure and 
whether it is likely to have to share the burden of future tax increases. 
Nevertheless,  allowing + to differ across countries  produces  some 
simulation results that do not have a very transparent exp1anati0n.I~ 
Thus our first simplification in this preliminary analysis was to constrain 
+ to have the same value in all three countries. This restriction was 
accepted by the data, on the basis of a likelihood ratio test, at the 2.5% 
level. The estimated common value of + is significantly different from 
both zero and unity. The value of 0.43 yielded by our sample implies 
that neither Ricardo-Barro debt neutrality nor the full inclusion of gov- 
ernment bonds in private net wealth is warranted on the basis of the 
data and is consistent with earlier estimates based on consumption Table 2.1  Coefficient Estimates for Investment and Saving Equations, Three-Stage Least Squares, 
1966-83 (I-ratios in parentheses) 
Saving Equations 
Parameter  bo  bi"  b2  b3  9" 
(Associated Variable)  (Constant)  (R)  (GAP)  (W(-  1))  (B,DEF)  R2  S.E.E. 
United States  ,2181  -  .om7  .257  -.0776  .4252  .629  ,0076 
(8.85)  (1.68)  (16.59)  (6.00)  (10.32) 
(1  3.94)  (1 .a)  (5.91)  (10.40)  (10.32) 
(8.80)  (1.68)  (5.16)  (3.67)  (10.32) 
Germany  ,4274  ~  ,0707  ,157  -.I322  .4252  306  ,0071 
Japan  .2678  -  ,0707  ,202  -.0513  ,4252  .I53  ,0127 Investment Equations 
Parameter  fo  .ti  f2  h 
(Associated Variable)  (Constant)  (R)  (GAP)  (K( -  1))  R2  S.E.E. 




.2838  -  ,1713  .327  -.I208 
(8.41)  (2.90)  (15.84)  (6.30) 
(4.58)  (1.33)  (4.94)  (3.51) 
.4647  -  .2155  ,342  -.I477 
.888  .0069 
.621  .0139 
,4045  -.I233  ,338  -.I174  .858  .0087 
(10.97)  (2.55)  (9.09)  (6.95) 
Rest-of-World Saving Minus Investment 
Parameter  ko  ki 
(Associated Variable)  (Constant)  (RROW)  R2  S.E.E. 
.00415  .040  1 
(9.77)  (3.06) 
.249  .0014 
System log likelihood:  412.6  System R2:  ,969  Weighted S.E.E.:  .0102 
Note:  For  the form of the investment and saving equations, see equations (9), (10).  and  (13) in  the text, 
respectively. All variables are expressed as decimal fractions or as ratios to capacity output. 
"Constrained to the same value for all three countries. Table 2.2  Coefficient Estimates for Export and Import Volume Equations, Three-Stage Least 
Squares, 1961-83  (I-ratios in parentheses) 
~~  ~~ 
Export Volume Equations 
Parameter  go  gl  g2  R3  g4 
(Associated Variable)  (Constant)  (7)  (GAPF)  (REEX)  (XV(-I))  R2  S.E.E. 
United States  .0825  .oO055  .150  -.03548  ,3988  .974  .0025 
(8.67)  (2.99)  (6.36)  (7.59)  (4.35) 
(1.39)  (1.25)  (4.86)  (8.04) 
(5.28)  (4.89)  (.42)  (4.35)  (1 I  .62) 
Germany  .0227  .o0097  .206  -.00535  ,9086  .959  .0079 
Japan  .0663  .00258  -.012  -.05200  ,4797  .971  .0047 
a 
Import Volume Equations 
Parameter  ho  hi  h2  h3  h4 
(Associated Variable)  (Constant)  (7)  (GAP)  (REEX)  (MV(-l))  R2  S.E.E. 
United States  .0021  .00144  ,058  .01015  .3940  .904  .oO40 
(.20)  (4.49)  (3.98)  (1.76)  (3.23) 
Germany  -  .W17  .00180  .I37  .04867  S840  .955  .0068 
Japan  -  .0278  .00106  .085  .05271  .3384  .826  .0057 
(2.52)  (4.13)  (3.22)  b  (4.80) 
(I  .98)  (3.74)  (4.60)  (3.70)  (3.12) 
System log likelihood:  520.9  System RZ:  .989  Weighted S.E.E.:  .0055 
Note: For the form ofthe  export and import volume equations, see equations (1 I)  and (12) in the text, respectively. 
All variables are expressed as decimal fractions or as ratios to capacity output, except time T which is incre- 
mented by one each year, and the real effective exchange rate which is an index number,  1980 = I. 
Constrained to equal the average of the export price elasticities cited for Germany in Helliwell-Padmore 1985, 
in the long run. 
bConstrained to equal the average of the import price elasticities cited for Germany in Goldstein-Khan 1985, in 
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functions (see Kochin 1974; Tanner 1979; Buiter and Tobin 1979; and 
Seater 1982). 
In view of the well-known difficulties of isolating a statistically robust 
effect of the real interest rate on saving, our second simplification was 
to constrain this coefficient to be the same for the three countries. Our 
estimate implies a small negative response of saving to an increase in 
the interest rate, suggesting that the income effect slightly outweighs 
the substitution effect.  I5 The equations for net investment are similar 
in the three countries; in all cases, investment responds positively to 
the output gap and negatively to the real interest rate. Coefficient f3 
implies a similar, rather slow, speed of adjustment to the desired capital 
stock  in all three countries. The effect  of  the real  interest  rate on 
investment is larger than that on saving; consequently,  saving minus 
investment in each of these countries responds positvely to the interest 
rate. Saving minus investment in the rest of  the world also responds 
positively to an increase in the real interest rate, proxied here as a 
weighted average of  real  rates in the  United  States, Germany, and 
Japan. 
The trade volume equations (for non-oil merchandise exports and 
imports relative to capacity output) depend on economic activity, the 
country’s real exchange rate, and a time trend. Historically, exports 
and imports have increased as a proportion of output over time, owing 
to the secular effects of the postwar liberalization of trade and increased 
specialization to exploit comparative advantage. For the three largest 
industrial countries there is a positive and statistically significant trend 
effect on trade volumes over and above the increase in capacity output. 
There are also significant cyclical effects, as measured by foreign and 
domestic gap variables in export and import equations, respectively. 
Export volumes respond negatively and imports positively to an ap- 
preciation of the real effective exchange rate (an increase in REEX). 
However, data for Germany had difficulty capturing these effects and 
we imposed a long-run elasticity of exports equal to 0.28 (at sample 
means), which is an average of estimates for Germany presented in 
Helliwell and Padmore (1989, and a long-run elasticity of exports equal 
to 0.79, the average of estimates for German total exports (Goldstein 
and Khan 1985,1079). For both exports and imports, lags in adjustment 
to relative price and activity changes seem to be present. 
2.4  Simulated Effects of  Shifts in Fiscal Policies 
In order to gauge the effects of shifts in fiscal policies on the level 
of world interest rates and on the pattern of current accounts and real 
exchange rates, we must specify the equations that close the system; 
the  complete  model is presented in  table  2.3.  First, we include  an 40  Malcolm D. Knight/Paul R.  Masson 
Table 2.3  Equations of the Simulation Model 
For i  = US, Germany (GE),  and Japan (JA): 
S;/YC, = bO;  + b1;Ri + b2iCAPi + b3;W,{- I)/YC;(  -  1) 
+ (1 - +i)DEFi/YCi 
Ii/YC; = YO; + fliR; + f2;GAP, + f3iK,{- l)/YC;(  -  1) 
Wi = +iBi  + K, + F; 
XVJYC; = go; + gl;T + g2iCAPF; + g3;REEX, + g4,XVi( -  I)/YCA- I) 
MV;/YC, = hO, + hl,T + h2;GAP; + h3iREEX; + h4iMV, (- I)/YCX- I) 
Ki  = Ki( -  1)  + I; 
CAi = S; -  I, - DEF; = XV; -  MVi  + Ri  F;( -  1)  + RES; 
B, = Bj( -  1)  + DEFi 
F, = Fi( -  I)  + CAi 
LN(YC;)  = jOi  + jliTLN(1 + n;) + (1 -jI;)LN(K;) 
For i  = GE and JA: 
(I 1)  R, = RUS -  ERDOT; 
For the rest of the world (ROW): 
(12) 
(13) 
(14)  CAROW =  -(CAUS  + CAGE/e8O.GE + CAJAle8O.JA) 
CAROWIYCROW  = M) + kl .  RROW 
RROW  = wl RUS + w2 RCE + w3 RJA 
identity that relates the current account balance to non-oil merchandise 
exports minus non-oil merchandise imports, plus investment income 
(which we proxy by  the real interest rate multiplied by the stock of 
real net foreign assets), plus other net exports of goods and services 
(oil trade, other services and unilateral transfers). The model solves 
for the values of the endogenous variables that make this definition 
consistent with the other way of expressing the current balance; namely, 
private saving minus private investment minus the government fiscal 
deficit. This dual identity is given as equation (7) in table 2.3. Though 
the model is fully simultaneous, it is useful to think of  the role of the 
real exchange rate as making these two definitions equal, given real 
interest rates and output gaps in each of the countries. 
We  also include a simple production function relationship (equation 
10) between the capital stock and capacity output. We  do not include 
the labor force explicitly, but rather include a trend term which captures 
both population growth and technical progress. On the basis of sample 
averages for the growth of the capital stock and output, we impose a 
plausible number for this growth rate, 3% per year, and make it common 
to all countries so that we can compare steady state solutions of the 41  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
model. We  also arbitrarily impose a common Cobb-Douglas production 
function (differing, however, by a scale factor), with a share of capital 
equal to one third. 
In the theoretical model of  section 2.2, the world rate of interest 
brings about equality of world saving and world investment; the dis- 
tribution of saving and investment between countries helps determine 
the real exchange rate between their currencies. The equality of world 
saving and investment is equivalent to the condition that current-account 
balances sum to zero globally, and in the simulation model we add the 
equation, (equation 14 in table 2.3) that enforces this condition for the 
United States, Japan, Germany, and the remaining countries taken as 
a group. In the data this condition also holds, as we have calculated 
residually the rest-of-world  current balance,  expressed in real  U.S. 
dollar terms; e80-GE and  e80.JA are just  base-period  (1980) dollar- 
exchange rates of the deutsche mark and the yen. 
The model is classical in that saving and investment determine real 
interest rates; monetary influences on real interest rates and real ex- 
change rates are intentionally neglected. Furthermore, the Keynesian 
adjustment mechanism, whereby shifts in savings and investment bring 
about changes to aggregate output, is also ignored; in simulation, the 
GAP variable is taken as exogenous to the model. As already noted, 
under floating exchange rates perfect substitutability between domestic 
and foreign assets does not require that real interest rates be equal at 
home and abroad: the two real rates will differ by the expected rate of 
change of the real exchange rate, which we call ERDOT. The simulation 
model includes the equations that relate real interest rates in Germany 
and Japan to that in the United States and to the expected real appre- 
ciation or depreciation of  the deutsche mark or the yen relative to the 
dollar. In the first simulations, reported in tables 2.4  to 2.7 below, these 
expected rates of change, ERDOT,, are treated as exogenous. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the equations of the full simulation model, 
including all identities; the coefficients used are those given in tables 
2.1 and 2.2.  To  begin the simulations a baseline was created with re- 
siduals added back to the equations so that the model replicated his- 
torical data. For convenience, it was further assumed that from 1983 
onward the values of variables were consistent with a steady state for 
the economy: in the baseline, ratios of real flows and stocks divided 
by  capacity output are constant, as are real interest rates and  real 
exchange rates. The baseline thus embodies the simplifying assumption 
that the secular growth in the relative importance of international trade 
comes to an end, so that there is no trend growth in exports and imports 
relative to capacity output. 
Our first set of experiments assumes independent reductions of the 
fiscal deficit by one percent of real capacity output in each of the three 
countries separately, beginning in 1985. We calculate the effects of these 42  Malcolm D. Knight/Wul R. Masson 
Table 2.4  Simulation.of a U.S. Fiscal Deficit Reduction Equal to 1 Percent 
of  Capacity Output, Starting in 1985: Deviations from Baseline, as 
percent of  baseline capacity output 
U.S.  Variables 











-  0.48 
-  0.47 
-  0.46 
-0.45 
-0.45 
-  0.44 
-  0.44 
-0.43 
-  0.43 
-0.48 
0.24  0.28  0.24 
0.24  0.29  0.48 
0.24  0.30  0.71 
0.24  0.31  0.93 
0.24  0.31  1.14 
0.24  0.32  1.34 
0.24  0.32  1.54 
0.22  0.34  2.25 
0.21  0.36  2.82 











0.10  -5.57 
0.21  -3.30 
0.32  -3.26 
0.43  -3.22 
0.55  -3.18 
0.67  -3.14 
0.79  -3.10 
1.25  -2.92 
1.67  -2.72 
3.32  0.52 
German Variables  Japanese Variables 
-  1.40 
-  1.51 
-  1.61 
-  1.71 
-  1.79 
-  1.88 
-  1.95 















0.10  0.30  0.30  0.10  0.10  0.18  0.18  0.10 
0.11  0.30  0.60  0.21  0.11  0.18  0.35  0.21 
0.12  0.30  0.87  0.33  0.12  0.18  0.52  0.32 
0.13  0.29  1.14  0.45  0.13  0.18  0.68  0.44 
0.13  0.29  1.40  0.57  0.13  0.18  0.84  0.56 
0.14  0.28  1.63  0.69  0.14  0.18  0.99  0.68 
0.14  0.27  1.86  0.81  0.14  0.18  1.14  0.80 
0.14  0.25  2.65  1.27  0.15  0.17  1.69  1.28 
0.14  0.23  3.28  1.67  0.16  0.16  2.14  1.74 
0.09  0.15  4.87  2.87  0.12  0.11  3.54  3.89 
"Percentage deviation from baseline. 
bDeviation from baseline, in percentage points. 
hypothetical changes on the steady state of the model, using a non- 
dynamic version of  it, as well as the dynamic path of the endogenous 
variables.  As detailed above, the dynamics of  the model arise from 
lagged adjustment of the capital stock and of private net wealth to their 
desired levels, as well as the gradual accumulation of government debt 
owing to the (assumed exogenous) fiscal deficit. In addition, there is 
slow adjustment of trade flows and the gradual accumulation of net 
claims on, or liabilities to, foreigners. 
Tables 2.4,2.5,  and 2.6 present separate simulation results for deficit 
reduction programs in the United States, Germany and Japan, respec- 
tively. Stock and flow variables are scaled by capacity output so that 
induced changes in them can be compared directly with the autonomous 
shock to the fiscal deficit and so that the simulation results are com- 
parable across countries. It should be stressed here that it is the total 43  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
deficit (inclusive of interest payments) that is being changed in these 
simulations; thus (unless ni  = 0) the model does not produce explosive 
growth in the ratio of the debt stock to capacity output, as would be 
the case if the primary deficit were increased autonomously and interest 
payments were allowed to grow without bound. Our experiments should 
therefore be viewed as changing the steady-state stock of bonds, with 
offsetting changes to taxes,  so that the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint is satisfied. Figure  2.2  compares the paths of real 
exchange rates and real interest  rates in the three simulations, and 
figure 2.3 plots the current-account balance and private investment, 
both as ratios to capacity output. 
A permanent fiscal deficit reduction of 1% of capacity output in the 
United States produces a substantial decline in U.S. real interest rates, 
from 6.8% in our baseline to 4.1% in the new steady state, a fall of 2.7 
percentage points (table 2.4). Since interest parity holds for real interest 
rates in the model and expected real exchange rate changes are assumed 
exogenous, foreign rates (not reported) also move by the same amount. 
Private saving declines by almost half of the reduction in government 
dissaving, mainly owing to the direct offset of (1 - cb)  multiplied by 
-2 
-4 
Reel exchange rare 
Real exchange rare 
-6 
UNITED STATES  GERMANY  JAPAN 
Real meres: rate  Real interesr rare 
Reel inreresr rare 
-2 
-3 
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-  --  long-run effect 
dynamic response  .- 
Fig. 2.2  Simulated changes in  real  exchange rates and real  interest 
rates in response to a fiscal deficit reduction, starting in 1985, 
equal  to  one  percent  of  capacity  output  in  the  country 
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the fiscal deficit-qua1  to 0.57% of  capacity output. The effect  on 
saving changes over time in response to two contrary forces: as the 
interest rate declines, target wealth increases, raising saving, but as 
wealth accumulation proceeds the positive effect on saving diminishes. 
Investment rises strongly, both on impact and in the long run, but not 
by enough to offset the increase in national saving resulting from the 
lower fiscal deficit. Consequently, the current account improves by an 
amount that expands over time to about four-tenths of  1% of capacity 
output and the net foreign claim position of the United States eventually 
rises by  13% of  capacity output. As a result, net wealth of  the U.S. 
private  sector increases, both  in the  short run and in the long run, 
despite a fall in the government debt component-only a fraction of 
which (0.43) is part of wealth. 
The real effective exchange rate displays interesting dynamics (fig. 
2.2). It depreciates substantially on impact-in  the case of a U.S. deficit 
reduction, the real effective exchange rate of the dollar depreciates by 
almost 696-a~  the increase in net national saving, to be consistent with 
a corresponding excess of exports over imports, requires an improve- 
ment in competitiveness of that amount. However, the real exchange 
rate appreciates thereafter, and the improvement in competitiveness 
becomes attenuated as lags in the response of  import and export vol- 
Currenr account ratio  Current account ratio 
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0 
-0.2  -0.2 
Current account rario 
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-0.1  -0.1 
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Fig. 2.3  Simulated changes in  current  balances and  private  invest- 
ment as percentages of capacity output, in response to a fiscal 
deficit reduction,  starting in  1985, equal to  one percent of 
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umes work themselves out; in addition, as the U.S. accumulates claims 
on foreigners its investment income account also improves, requiring 
less of  a surplus on merchandise trade.  By showing that the steady- 
state change in  the real exchange rate may actually be in a direction 
opposite to the impact effects given by the simple model of  section 
2.2, the simulation model illustrates the importance of taking into ac- 
count the effects of alternative policies on the rates of wealth and capital 
accumulation. It also demonstrates that overshooting of real exchange 
rates can occur not only in response to monetary shocks in the presence 
of sticky prices as in Dornbusch (1976), but also as the result of  real 
shocks when there is slow adjustment of trade flows, a point empha- 
sized in theoretical work by Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and Frenkel 
and Rodriguez (1982). 
The U.S. deficit reduction has consequences for the rest of the world 
through changes in other countries’ exchange rates and interest rates. 
The decline in the latter stimulates investment and increases the equi- 
librium capital stock in Germany and Japan (table 2.4). Private saving 
increases in both countries (though only slightly) and as a result the 
current-account  balance (here equal to changes in saving minus in- 
vestment, as the fiscal position has not changed) worsens in both coun- 
tries in the short and medium run. The current balance of the rest of 
the world (not reported) also worsens as a result of the shock. 
Given, among other assumptions, a common value of + for the three 
countries, fiscal deficit reductions in Germany and Japan produce broadly 
similar patterns for the variables of interest (tables 2.5 and 2.6). How- 
ever, effects on domestic (and world) interest rates are smaller in re- 
sponse to a fiscal deficit reduction equivalent to 1% of capacity output. 
In contrast, the current-account effects are considerably larger than 
for the United  States, owing mainly to a smaller stimulus to private 
investment. It is also interesting to note that for Germany and Japan, 
as well as the United States, the long-run effect on the real exchange 
rate is the opposite of  its short-run effect. In the long run the real 
exchange rate appreciates in response to a shift to fiscal restraint be- 
cause the resulting increase in the net foreign claims position improves 
the services account sufficiently that it must be offset by an appreci- 
ation,  in  order for net  foreign claims  to settle down to a constant 
proportion of capacity output (or of wealth). It need not necessarily 
be the case, however, that appreciation is the long-run outcome. For 
a given positive net claim position, the services account will tend to- 
ward deficit as interest rates decline. Thus it is possible that the services 
balance will deteriorate and the real exchange rate depreciate in the 
long run. Obviously, the sign of this long-run effect is dependent on a 
number of  parameters, including investment and saving elasticities, 
whether the country is a net creditor or debtor, and the “economic 
size” of the country (see Sachs and Wyplosz 1984). 46  Malcolm D. KnightIPaul R. Masson 
Table 2.5  Simulation of a German Fiscal Deficit Reduction Equal to One 
Percent of Capacity Output, Starting in 1985: Deviations from 
Baseline, as percent of baseline capacity output 
German Variables 

















-  0.53 
-  0.53 
-0.53 











0.36  0.09  0.36  0.03 
0.37  0.18  0.72  0.07 
0.37  0.27  1.07  0.10 
0.37  0.35  1.41  0.14 
0.38  0.43  1.74  0.18 
0.38  0.50  2.07  0.21 
0.38  0.58  2.39  0.25 
0.39  0.82  3.61  0.40 
0.39  1.01  4.71  0.52 
0.41  1.50  13.50  0.88 
-  7.90 
-  2.83 
-  2.67 
-  2.53 
-  2.40 
-  2.28 
-  2.17 
-  1.80 
-  1.53 
0.37 
-  0.43 
-  0.47 
-  0.50 
-  0.53 
-  0.56 
-  0.58 




U.S.  Variables  Japanese Variables 































~  ~  ~~ 
0.07  0.03  0.03  0.05 
0.15  0.06  0.03  0.05 
0.22  0.10  0.04  0.05 
0.29  0.13  0.04  0.06 
0.35  0.17  0.04  0.06 
0.42  0.21  0.04  0.06 
0.48  0.24  0.04  0.05 
0.69  0.39  0.05  0.05 
0.87  0.52  0.05  0.05 
1.38  1.03  0.04  0.03 
0.05  0.03 
0.11  0.06 
0. I6  0.10 
0.21  0. I4 
0.26  0.17 
0.31  0.21 
0.35  0.25 
0.52  0.40 
0.66  0.54 
1.09  1.20 
=Percentage  deviation from baseline. 
bDeviation from baseline, in percentage points. 
In  addition  to simulating the effects  of  hypothetical fiscal deficit 
reductions that begin in 1985, it is also of interest to see the extent to 
which shifts in fiscal positions in the three largest industrial economies 
since 1980 help to explain the interest rate and exchange rate changes 
that have occurred since then. Our model is intentionally an incomplete 
description of  the forces at work-monetary  policy  is not included 
explicitly, nor are Keynesian output effects. Thus this simulation may 
help to isolate and quantify the importance of medium-term saving and 
investment behavior, relative to these other factors, in explaining recent 
history. 
The issue of how much of the dollar’s strength can be attributed to 
fiscal policy shifts, and the extent to which such fiscal changes also 
explain high real interest rates both in the United States and elsewhere, 
has been addressed in several recent papers. Blanchard and Summers 47  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
Table 2.6  Simulation of a Japanese Fiscal Deficit Reduction Equal to One 
Percent of Capacity Output, Starting in 1985: Deviations from 
Baseline, as percent of  baseline capacity output 
Japanese Variables 












-  0.53 
-  0.53 
-0.53 
-  0.52 
-  0.52 
-0.52 
-  0.52 
-0.51 
-run  -0.53 
0.07  0.40  0.07  0.40  0.04 
0.07  0.40  0.14  0.78  0.08 
0.07  0.40  0.20  1.16  0.13 
0.07  0.40  0.27  1.53  0.17 
0.07  0.41  0.33  1.89  0.22 
0.07  0.41  0.45  2.25  0.26 
0.07  0.41  0.50  2.59  0.31 
0.07  0.42  0.66  3.89  0.50 
0.06  0.42  0.83  5.07  0.68 
0.04  0.43  1.38  14.31  1.51 
-3.31 
-2.02 
-  1.91 
-1.81 
-  1.72 
-  1.63 
-  1.54 
-  1.22 
-0.93 
1.75 
-  0.55 
-  0.59 
-  0.63 
-  0.67 
-0.70 
-  0.73 
-  0.76 
-  0.86 
-  0.93 
-  1.06 
U.S. Variables  German Variables 











0.04  0.09  0.09  0.04  0.04 
0.04  0.09  0.19  0.08  0.04 
0.05  0.09  0.28  0.12  0.05 
0.05  0.09  0.36  0.17  0.05 
0.05  0.09  0.44  0.21  0.05 
0.05  0.09  0.53  0.26  0.05 
0.05  0.09  0.60  0.31  0.05 
0.06  0.09  0.88  0.49  0.06 
0.06  0.08  1.10  0.65  0.05 
-run  0.04  0.05  1.75  1.29  0.03 
0.12  0.12  0.04 
0.12  0.23  0.08 
0.12  0.34  0.13 
0.11  0.44  0.17 
0.11  0.54  0.22 
0.11  I .64  0.27 
0.11  1.73  0.32 
0.10  1.03  0.54 
0.09  1.28  0.65 
0.06  1.90  1.12 
aPercentage deviation from baseline. 
“Deviation  from baseline, in percentage points. 
(1984) consider a number of explanations for high real interest rates, 
among them fiscal deficits. They argue that even though the U.S. deficit 
shows an increase of  3.9 percentage points of  GNP over the period 
1978-85,16 fiscal contraction in other countries implies an increase of 
only 0.8 percentage points for the six largest OECD countries (Blan- 
chard and Summers 1984, 298). Adjusting deficits for inflation and for 
cyclical position and allowing for anticipated future deficits leads them 
to conclude: “On balance, therefore, we  find no evidence that fiscal 
policy  in the OECD as a whole is responsible, through its effect on 
saving, for high long real rates” (Blanchard and Summers 1984, 302). 
Another recent paper examines the consequences of  the “Mundell- 
Reagan mix of fiscal expansion and monetary contraction” (Sachs 1985, 
119), in particular its effect on the U.S. dollar. Simulations of  a small 
global macroeconomic model, as well as other evidence presented by 48  Malcolm D. Knight/Paul R. Masson 
Sachs, tends to support the view that the U.S. monetary/fiscal policy 
mix-even accompanied by fiscal contraction in the rest of the OECD- 
goes a long way toward explaining developments in financial and ex- 
change markets in the last few years. The model simulation assumes 
“a sustained U.S. debt-financed fiscal expansion of 4 percent of GNP; 
a sustained ROECD [rest of the OECD area] fiscal contraction of 2 
percent of  ROECD GNP; a substantial tightening of U.S.  monetary 
policy; and no change in  ROECD monetary policy. . . . The dollar 
appreciates by 39.4 percent relative to the ECU, and U.S. short-term 
real interest rates rise by  8.0 percentage points relative  to abroad” 
(Sachs 1985, 174). 
One reason for the difference in the conclusions of these two papers 
is clearly disagreement concerning the extent of shifts in the stance of 
fiscal policy-both  the stance of  current policy and that of expected 
future policy. We  will not attempt to shed any light on that particular 
issue. Rather we will see the extent to which our model corroborates 
the results obtained by  Sachs. It should be  stressed again that our 
model is classical in its foundations and does not include either the 
output effects obtained by  Sachs or the effects of the monetary con- 
traction in the United States that Sachs assumes. 
Table 2.7 presents simulation results for a combined shift in fiscal 
policy toward expansion in the United States and contraction in Japan 
and Germany. For simplicity, these changes are assumed to be imple- 
mented in their entirety in  1981. No attempt is made here to capture 
the gradual shifts in fiscal stance that have actually occurred since 1981 
(International Monetary Fund  1985, Appendix  table  15), nor  is the 
question addressed as to whether the gradual changes that did occur 
were fully anticipated in 1981 or subsequently. Rather, the goal is merely 
to gauge whether the direction and magnitude of changes predicted by 
the model are consistent with average historical experience since the 
beginning of the decade. 
It can be  seen that the simulation results in table 2.7  are broadly 
consistent with those of Sachs and with historical experience, though 
they differ in a number of details. First, the size of the simulated real 
appreciation of the dollar is 25%. This compares with an actual appre- 
ciation of about 57% from the dollar’s trough in 1980 to the peak of 
early 1985 (International Monetary Fund 1985, 8). Alternatively, if the 
dollar’s real value during 1985 is compared to its average value for the 
decade 1974-83,  the actual net  appreciation is  33%.  The simulated 
appreciation is also considerably less than that of Sachs, which is not 
surprising since it does not account for a tightening of U.S. monetary 
policy. As in Sachs, the simulated path involves a large initial overshoot 
and then a gradual decline, whereas the U.S. dollar appreciated nearly 
continuously from 1980 to early in 1985. 49  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
Table 2.7  Simulation of a U.S. Fiscal Expansion Equal to Four Percent of 
Capacity Output, and German and Japanese Fiscal Contraction 
Equal to Two Percent of Capacity Output, All Occurring in 1981: 
Deviations from Baseline, as percent of baseline capacity output 
Country/ 
























-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 
-  2.00 






-  1.42 
-  1.44 
-  1.47 
-  1.49 
-  1.50 
-  1.42 
-  1.44 
-  1.46 
-  1.48 
-  1.49 
-  0.63 
-  0.63 
-  0.63 
-  0.63 
-  0.62 
-  0.79 
-  0.78 
-0.77 
-  0.76 
-0.74 
-0.46 
-  0.46 
-  0.47 
-  0.47 
-0.47 
-  1.33 
-  1.36 
-  1.38 
-  1.39 











24.4  3.66 
12.9  3.94 
11.7  4.21 
10.4  4.46 
9.2  4.70 
-26.0  3.66 
-6.7  3.94 
-5.2  4.21 
- 3.9  4.46 
-2.6  4.70 
-8.0  3.66 
-  3.5  3.94 
-2.8  4.21 
-2.0  4.46 
-  1.4  4.70 
"Percentage deviation from baseline. 
bDeviation from baseline, in percentage points. 
Second, the extent of the simulated rise in real interst rates-initially 
almost 4  percentage points and growing to almost 5% after five years- 
compares to an increase of about 8 percentage points that was observed 
in the United States in  1981 (International Monetary Fund  1985, 18); 
the rise in other countries has been closer to our figures, however. All 
in all, if one accepts the size of the fiscal shifts assumed by the sim- 
ulation, then the view that fiscal policy changes help to explain the 
direction and rough order of magnitude of the net movements in real 
interest rates in the 1980s receives strong support. 
Finally, the simulation results are consistent with some-but  not all- 
of the broad  patterns  of  saving and investment flows among major 
industrial countries in recent years. Our assumed fiscal shifts produce 
a substantial worsening in the model-by  almost 1.5% of capacity out- 
put-in  the U.S.  current-account  balance, a similar improvement in 
the German position, and an improvement of the Japanese position by 
1%.  These changes in fact understate  the shifts in current account 
positions that have occurred since 1981 for the United States and Japan: 
from a position of near balance in that year, the United States moved 
to a current-account deficit of almost 4%  of GNP by 1985, and Japan 50  Malcolm D. Knight/Wul R. Masson 
to a surplus of a like amount. The model does not capture other changes 
that are important here; in particular, it does not take account of the 
impact of tax changes in the United  States that helped to stimulate 
investment, or of the possibility of a general improvement in the pro- 
ductivity of  U.S. enterprises. Nor does it allow for possible effects of 
financial liberalization in Japan on saving and on capital outflows. The 
estimation residuals give some indication of the importance of these 
omitted factors, at least until the end of the sample period in 1983. For 
1983, the residuals are in fact not unusually large, except for Japanese 
private saving, which is underpredicted by about one-half of  1% of 
capacity output. It is not the case that U.S.  investment is underpre- 
dicted, as might occur if either tax changes or a general improvement 
in expected productivity since 1981 have provided an unusual stimulus 
to investment. In fact, our equation slightly overpredicts U.S. invest- 
ment in 1983, but by a negligible amount, 0.01% of capacity output. In 
contrast, we underpredict both German and Japanese investment in 
that year. 
We  have until now assumed in the simulations that expectations of 
future exchange rate changes are not affected by the change in fiscal 
policies, despite the fact that the U.S.  dollar depreciates continually 
from the second year of the simulation onward. In addition, we have 
not taken account of the fact that changes in real interest rates and 
exchange rates give rise to valuation  effects on wealth. In order to 
examine the importance of these two assumptions, we perform two 
additional simulations. In the first, we assume that government debt 
takes the form of consols and that net foreign claims are in foreign 
currencies; furthermore, households are assumed to revalue their be- 
ginning-of-period stocks of these assets fully to reflect current values 
of the real interest rate R and real exchange rate REEX. In particular, 
lagged wealth in equation (1) of table 2.3 (the term multiplied by b3i 
and divided by  YCi)  is now calculated as 
+j[R,( -  l)/Rj]Bi(  -  1)  + Ki( -  1)  + [REEX,( -  l)/REEXi]Fj(  -  1). 
Equations (8)  and (9)  are similarly modified. In the second additional 
simulation,  perfect  foresight  is imposed  on both  exchange rate and 
interest rate expectations. Interest rate expectations appear in the ver- 
sion of the model with valuation effects because the bond rate is now 
assumed to be the yield on a perpetual bond, while the expected ex- 
change rate in the interest parity condition, equation (11) of table 2.3, 
is for next period’s rate. We  therefore add an arbitrage condition im- 
plying that holding-period yields on long-term interest rates, R, equal 
those on one-period bonds, say RS: 
Ri -  Ri(+  1)/Rj = RSj. 51  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
The exchange rate expectations that appear in the interest parity con- 
dition are for bilateral exchange rates  against the U.S.  dollar. This 
version of the model therefore must also contain equations relating real 
effective exchange rate movements  to the real bilateral rates of  the 
yen, the deutsche mark, and the “rest-of-world”  currency against the 
U.S.  dollar, using the weights that define the real effective exchange 
rate indexes. The effective exchange rate for the rest-of-the-world sec- 
tor has been assumed constant in the calculation of the ROW interest 
rate, but its bilateral rate does move against the dollar. 
The results of  these additional simulations are compared in figure 
2.4 to the static expectations results without valuation effects of table 
2.7. It can be seen that though interest rate patterns are considerably 
different, the U.S.  real effective exchange rate has substantially the 
same path, after a somewhat smaller initial appreciation of 22%.  Val- 
uation effects reduce the size of the interest rate response to an increase 
in the fiscal deficit because they reduce initial wealth, thus creating an 
incentive for the private sector to increase saving. Making endogenous 
the expectations of  real exchange rate movements drives a wedge be- 
tween U.S. and foreign rates, allowing initial effects to reflect national 
saving and investment movements: U.S. rates rise more, while in Ger- 
many and Japan, where there is a fiscal contraction, real interest rates 
rise much less than in the static expectations case with valuation ef- 
fects. The ultimate effects in our model will be the same under static 
and rational expectations, and with and without valuation effects, since 
in all three cases real exchange rates and real interest rates eventually 
settle down to constant levels, and hence interest rates in the three 
countries must rise by the same amount in the long run. 
In summary, adding valuation effects and rational exchange rate ex- 
pectations  to the model does not change the orders of  magnitude of 
the simulated changes in interest rates. Furthermore, our conclusions 
concerning the size of the exchange rate movements induced by fiscal 
policy shifts are invariant to the expectations alternatives considered 
here. Whether static or  rational expectations are assumed, autonomous 
shifts reflecting the size (but not the timing) of fiscal expansion in the 
United States since 1980 and restraint in Germany and Japan are sim- 
ulated to result in strong initial upward pressure on the real value of 
the U.S. dollar. 
The timing of  exchange rate movements, in response to a simulated 
fiscal shock, is similar in  all these simulations; it involves an initial 
overshoot, rather than the gradual rise of the dollar against other major 
currencies that has occurred since 1980. It is worth noting that if  we 
had  assumed  a more gradual (and realistic) change in the stance of 
fiscal policies spread out over 1981-85,  instead of  making the entire 
shift occur in the first year, the simulated path of the U.S. dollar would 52  Malcolm D. Knight/Paul R. Masson 
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Fig. 2.4  Simulated changes in the U.S. real exchange rate and in real 
interest rates in response to a U.S.  fiscal expansion and a 
German and Japanese fiscal contraction occurring in  1981: 
deviation from baseline 
have more closely matched  the persistent appreciation that  actually 
took place over this period. A number of  other factors-particularly 
shifts in monetary policy and in relative cyclical positions-have  also 
been  important  determinants  of  the timing of  the interest  rate  and 
exchange rate changes. Nevertheless, the basic conclusion of this sim- 
ulation is that a shift in the pattern of fiscal positions of the magnitude 
that has actually occurred among the largest industrial countries is a 
major factor responsible for the net size of  the interest and exchange 
rate changes that took place among them during the first half of  this 
decade. 53  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
2.5  Summary and Conclusions 
In order to order a comprehensive explanation of the relation be- 
tween the real exchange rate and the balance of payments, it is nec- 
essary to evaluate three interrelated mechanisms: the effect of changes 
in competitiveness on the current account; the impact of shifts in in- 
terest rates, expectations, and other factors on international asset port- 
folios; and the effect of autonomous changes in the saving-investment 
balance on the level of desired capital transfers among countries. Both 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the first mechanism have 
been thoroughly investigated over the last 20 years and are well under- 
stood. The theoretical aspects of  the  second mechanism  have been 
analyzed extensively since the mid- 1970s, with  the  development of 
portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination. Although the 
problems of specifying the determinants of exchange rate expectations 
have led to intractable empirical difficulties, these models have pro- 
vided many important insights into the process of exchange rate de- 
termination. The purpose of this paper has been to suggest that the 
final mechanism, saving-investment shifts, may also yield important 
insights into the behavior of real exchange rates, particularly at times 
that are dominated by major autonomous disturbances in the medium- 
term  flows of  national  saving and investment,  or in preferences re- 
garding net international capital transfers. A number of points are worth 
noting in the context of this argument. 
First, as section 2.2 has served to show, the theoretical underpinnings 
of the latter mechanism are to be found in the neoclassical theory of 
international capital transfers. In focusing on the response of real cap- 
ital movement to disturbances in national saving-investment balances, 
this explanation implies quite a different set of causal linkages between 
the exchange rate and the current account than does the more popular 
explanation based on the responsiveness of import and export demands 
to autonomous changes in  relative  prices.  At times when economic 
developments are dominated by large autonomous changes in national 
saving and investment balances-particularly  those induced by shifts 
in public sector fiscal positions-the  exchange rate and current-account 
effects of  such disturbances may be expected to exert an overriding 
influence on the level of the real exchange rate. 
The empirical model described in sections 2.3 and 2.4 tends to con- 
firm the view that the directions and orders of magnitude of movements 
in real exchange rates and real interest rates in major industrial coun- 
tries are related  to shifts in  fiscal positions in the manner we  have 
described. Our estimated saving equations imply that changes in fiscal 
deficits are not offset one-for-one by changes in private saving; con- 
sequently, these fiscal shifts require equilibrating movements in  the 
pattern of real exchange rates and, to the extent that the global balance 
between saving and investment has altered, in the level of real interest 54  Malcolm D. Knight/Paul R. Masson 
rates. The magnitude of the resulting exchange rate and interest rate 
movements depends on a number of factors; the model includes esti- 
mated investment functions and merchandise trade equations for the 
three major industrial countries as well as an equation explaining ag- 
gregate saving (net of investment) by the rest of the world. Simulated 
changes in fiscal deficits equal to 1%  of a country’s capacity GDP- 
well  within  historical  experience-produce,  in  our  model,  sizable 
movements in these interest rates and exchange rates. The model pre- 
dicts that the exchange rate movements  are largest when  the fiscal 
change is first implemented and are later reversed as trade flows adjust 
gradually to relative prices and as asset stocks-physical  capital, gov- 
ernment debt, and claims on foreigners-move  over time to their new 
equilibrium  levels.  The eventual equilibrium  change of  the real  ex- 
change rate in response to a fiscal contraction may involve either an 
appreciation or a depreciation, depending on the ultimate effect of the 
shock on the balance on investment earnings from abroad. 
In an attempt to compare these movements with recent experience, 
we subjected the model to a stylized pattern of fiscal policy shifts that 
broadly describes the net size of the changes in three major industrial 
countries since the beginning of this decade, namely a move to fiscal 
expansion in the United States and fiscal contractions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and in Japan (Sachs 1985). The size of the sim- 
ulated response of exchange rates-an  initial appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar in real terms of about 25Yo-and  of U.S. real interest rates-an 
initial rise of three or four percentage points, depending on assumptions 
concerning exchange rate expectations and valuation effects-is  a siz- 
able fraction of the changes observed since 1981. It is clear, however, 
that other factors not captured by the model, such as cyclical effects, 
uncertainty about the future stance of fiscal policy, “safe havens,” and 
monetary policy effects, are part of a more complete explanation. 
The model may nevertheless help in evaluating whether observed 
exchange rate patterns are related to  fundamental policy factors, rather 
than to portfolio shifts or the volatility of expectations. A crucial issue 
in macroeconomic policy is that of determining the pattern of current- 
account balances and real exchange rates among industrial countries 
that would be sustainable in the medium term (Artus and Knight 1984). 
Standard portfolio balance  models  have not  yielded many practical 
insights into this problem.  The present model,  because it considers 
saving and investment decisions in the context of  longer-term asset 
stock equilibrium, may help to evaluate sustainable levels of current 
accounts and real exchange rates and how’they depend on one impor- 
tant set of determinants, the stance of fiscal policies in major countries. 55  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
Appendix 
Data Sources 
Except where noted otherwise, all flow data are taken from the national 
accounts of the country concerned. Sources: Data Resources Inc. (DRI) 
for the United States; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) National Accounts, 1960-77  and 1971 -83,  for 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. Real flows and stocks are 
valued at 1980 local currency prices. 
Variables for the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and Japan (i = US, GE,  JA) 
CAi 
Bi 
National accounts net exports of goods and services divided 
by the GDP deflator. 
Real government net debt, calculated by cumulating general 
government fiscal deficits from benchmark figures, based 
on debt/GDP ratios in 1982 (Muller and Price 1984): 23.6% 
for the United States, 23.4% for Japan, and 19.8% for the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The net debt series was then 
divided by the GDP deflator. 
Real general government deficit corrected for inflation, cal- 
culated as Bi  -  Bi( - l). 
Real net foreign asset position, calculated by cumulating 
CA,, using benchmark  figures for nominal  net  claims on 
foreigners valued in local currency at the end of 1982, and 
divided by the 1982 GDP deflator. For the United States, 
the benchmark is $149.5 billion (Department of Commerce, 
Survey of  Current Business, June 1984, p. 75); for Germany 
DM 66.5 billion (Monthly Report of  the Deutsche Bundes- 
bank, October 1984, p. 35); and for Jaban $24.7 billion (Bank 
of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1983, p. 248). 
Output gap, as a percentage of capacity output: equals ac- 
tual GDP divided by capacity output (YC,)  minus one. As 
YCi is calculated, GAP, is the same as the output gap in 
manufacturing (Artus 1977). 
Foreign output gap: actual GDP for 9 industrial countries 
(excluding the country concerned) divided  by  the corre- 
sponding potential output, minus one. The 10 countries are 
the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
















Real private net investment, residential plus nonresidential. 
Real private net capital stock. For the United States it was 
calculated as the sum of the nonresidential and residential 
real stocks, minus the government residential stock (Source: 
DRI). For the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, Ki 
was calculated by cumulating Zi  using a benchmark figure. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany this figure was the 
1970 total net capital stock minus the 1970 government cap- 
ital stock (OECD), Flows and Stocks ofFixed Capital, 195.5- 
80).  For Japan, where a real net capital stock figure was not 
available, preliminary estimation of an investment equation 
chose the value of  the  1960 capital/GDP ratio (3.18) that 
maximized the fit of the equation. 
Volume  of  non-oil  merchandise  imports,  in  real,  local- 
currency terms. Source: International Monetary Fund. 
Real long-term interest rate, calculated as the nominal long- 
term government bond rate (Source: IMF, Znternational Fi- 
nancial Statistics) minus the percentage change in the GDP 
deflator. The result  was divided by  100 to get an interest 
rate expressed as a decimal fraction. 
Real effective exchange rate index, 1980  =  1  (increase in- 
dicates appreciation); calculated as the country’s normal- 
ized unit labor costs (NULC) relative to a weighted average 
of its competitors’ NULC, in a common currency (Source: 
IMF, International Financial Statistics). 
Residual current account item, equal to the oil trade bal- 
ance, the balance on services excluding investment income, 
and unilateral transfers. Calculated as CA; -  XVi + MV, 
Real net private saving, calculated as CAi  + Zj + DEF,. 
Volume  of  non-oil  merchandise  exports,  in  real,  local- 
currency terms. Source: International Monetary Fund, staff 
estimates. 
Real private sector net wealth, calculated as +; Bi  + Ki + 
Fi. 
Capacity GDP: calculated by applying the gap between ac- 
tual and potential manufacturing output (Artus 1977) to ac- 
tual GDP. 
-  Ri Fi( -  1). 
Variables for Germany and Japan 
EKDOT,  Expected rate of change of the bilateral real exchange rate 
against the US.  dollar (depreciation, if positive): calculated 
as RUs -  Rj. 57  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
Variables for the Rest of  the World  (ROW) 
CAROW  Proxy  for the  ROW  real  current  balance,  calculated as 
-  (CAUS + CAGH1.815  + CAJA/225.82): denominators 
contain 1980 bilateral rates against the dollar of the deutsche 
mark and the yen. 
RROW  Real interest rate, calculated as a GDP-weighted average of 
Rus, RGEl  and RJA. 
YCROW  Capacity output, in 1980 U.S. dollars, calculated by aggre- 
gating the remaining seven out of our sample of ten indus- 
trial countries. 
Notes 
1. Metzler (1960,232-33) anticipated a point that is emphasized by the recent 
literature when he observed: “I would say that the elasticity of demand [for 
imports] does not determine the degree to which the balance of trade expands 
to meet a given deficit; this depends, rather, upon internal conditions such as 
the slopes of the saving and investment schedules, relative to the slope of the 
capital outflow. . . .  The elasticities of demand for imports govern merely the 
changes in  terms of  trade needed  to get the balance  of  trade required  for 
equilibrium.” 
2. Our analysis is intended to refer to the largest industrial economies. Fur- 
thermore, it specifically excludes cases where a country’s initial fiscal position 
is viewed as unsustainable, either because it implies a continuously rising ratio 
of government debt to GNP (Masson  1985) or because the initial outstanding 
stock of official foreign debt poses significant “sovereign credit risk” problems. 
3. This is so even though, as Buiter (1983) has rightly emphasized, both the 
time path and the steady-state effects of shifts in fiscal policy depend crucially 
on the specific types of public sector spending and tax changes by which they 
are implemented. 
4. This highly restrictive assumption is relaxed in section 2.3. 
5. The relationship between integration of  national capital markets and the 
extent national saving and investment move together has been considered by 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and a number of subsequent authors. Murphy 
(1984)  has shown that if  countries do not face a perfectly  elastic supply of 
capital because they have a non-negligible effect on the world rate of interest, 
then there will be an association between national saving and investment  despite 
perfect capital mobility. Frankel (1985) points out that even for a small country 
domestic crowding out occurs in response to a fiscal shock unless both capital 
market integration and goods market integration prevail,  the latter condition 
being equivalent to purchasing power panty. 
6. It is assumed that governments levy taxes on their own residents only, 
and that taxes are lump-sum, so that they modify neither the return to labor 
nor that to capital. 
7. In general, + need not be constant, and will depend on the paths of taxes 
and interest rates. Let H be human wealth and W  financial wealth, defined as 
follows (Blanchard 1985, 239): 58  Malcolm D. KnightPaul R. Masson 
H(t) =  ,  [Y(s) - T(s)le-Jf(dv) 
+
 P)dvds  r 
= n(Y - T; r+ p) 
W (t) = B(r) + C(t) 
where  Y is noninterest  income,  T lump-sum  taxes, B government bonds, C 
other forms of financial wealth, and II the present-value operator (Blanchard 
and Summers 1984, 317). The government’s budget constraint in integral form 
is 
B(t) = r[T(s)  - G(S)]~-J:~~)~~  ds 
Using the government’s budget constraint, we can express H in terms of current 
holdings of government debt and future government spending, not taxes: 
= n(T - G; r). 
H  = n(Y;  r  + p) - II(T; r  + p) 
= n(Y;r + p) - (1 - +)n(G;r)  -  (I - +)B 
where 
+ =  1 - II(T; r  + p)/II(T;  r). 
We  can now define new measures of human and financial wealth as follows: 
H  = n(Y;  r  + p) -  (1 - +)II(G; r) 
= +B + C. 
If r(s), T(s)  and G(s)  are constant for t 5  s < m ,  then 
+ = 1 -  r/(r + p) 
H  = n(Y - G; r  + p). 
8. Since a change in the real exchange rate has a valuation effect as well as 
a volume effect on N, our prior that N. > 0 entails the assumption  that the 
Marshall-Lerner  condition  is  fulfilled.  Specifically,  N. > 0  requires  that 
6q. + p,  > 1 where qs  is the elasticity of the volume of home-country gross 
exports (X)  with respect to E,  p,  is the absolute value of  the corresponding 
elasticity of ROW gross exports x’,  and 6 = X/  EX’  is the initial ratio of home 
to foreign exports, expressed in a common numeraire. 
9. The relevant modification is that S(R)  is only the interest-sensitive  com- 
ponent of private saving, and $0  represents the net effect of government fiscal 
policy  on total (private plus public)  national  saving, given  the value of  the 
Ricardian equivalence parameter +. 
10. Wallich (1983) refers to the fact that an increase in the home country’s 
fiscal deficit will  induce a capital  inflow because it  tends to raise  domestic 
interest rates “relative to foreign rates.” It is certainly probable that an  increase 
in  the home country’s fiscal deficit will  raise its real interest rate relative to 
that prevailing abroad, either because domestic and foreign financial assets are 
not viewed by wealth-holders as perfect substitutes, or because investors ex- 
pect a real  exchange rate depreciation. However,  even if  interest rates are 
assumed equal at home and abroad, as in the simple model discussed  here, 
the new equilibrium  will  involve an appreciation  of the home currency as a 59  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
result of an increase in its fiscal deficit. It will also be true that interest rates 
in both countries will be higher. 
1 1. Also note that a one unit increase in the ROW fiscal deficit would increase 
the world interest rate by the same amount as a one unit increase in the domestic 
deficit only if 4 = @. 
12. Published data on the real capital stock are calculated by cumulating real 
gross investment and subtracting  physical depreciation; we have not attempted 
to measure the market value of the capital stock, as valued, for instance, in 
the stock market.  To calculate real government  debt, we cumulate  nominal 
deficits  and divide  by  the GDP deflator;  accounting  for valuation  changes 
requires knowledge of the maturity structure of the government debt. Under 
the assumption made here that all government  debt takes the form of one- 
period bonds, there are no valuation effects of changes in the real interest rate 
on the real stock of government debt. Finally, real net claims on foreigners are 
obtained  by cumulating current account surpluses and dividing by the GDP 
deflator. There is an implicit assumption that foreign claims and liabilities are 
in domestic currency, otherwise there would be a valuation effect associated 
with changes in the exchange rate. Naturally this cannot be true of all countries, 
and there is a residual region in the model whose net claims must therefore be 
in foreign currency. The sensitivity of the results to valuation effects on the 
stocks of government debt and net claims on foreigners is examined in section 
2.4. 
13. In the estimation work that follows, the ERDOT, are effectively treated 
as exogenous variables. However, the simulation model is later used to study 
the effects of changes in exchange rate expectations. 
14. In particular, they yielded the implausible result that fiscal contraction 
in Germany and Japan would lead to larger falls in the general level of interest 
rates than an equal contraction (expressed as a ratio to capacity output) in the 
United States. 
15. This empirical result is generally regarded as counterintuitive. In a recent 
paper, however, Bernheim and Shoven (1985) present evidence that during the 
past  few years net  contributions to pension  funds, which  make  up a  large 
proportion of total private saving in the United States, have tended to fall as 
real  interest rates increased. This implies  a negative  relation  between  real 
interest  rates and private saving in the United States. The negative relation 
occurs because roughly 70% of pension fund assets are in “defined-benefit’’ 
plans for which, other things equal, a rise in real interest rates allows firms to 
finance  the benefits  stipulated  by  the plan  with  a  lower  level  of  corporate 
contributions. 
16. Figures for 1984-85  were taken from OECD estimates. 
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COmIlleIlt  Olivier Jean Blanchard 
This paper addresses the most interesting question in international fiscal 
economics today. Namely, how much of  the movement in real interest 
Olivier Jean Blanchard is professor of economics at MIT and a research associate of 
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rates and exchange rates of the last five years is due to disequilibrium, 
Mundell-Fleming, effects of the international fiscal mix, and how much 
is due instead to equilibrium, full employment investment-savings, ef- 
fects of that mix? The question is crucial because how we answer it 
determines  how  we  forecast the future.  Put crudely, disequilibrium 
effects cannot last very long while equilibrium effects may be with us 
for the foreseeable future. 
The strategy of the paper is to ask: Supposing that there had been 
no disequilibrium effects in the last five years, that prices and wages 
had been flexible enough to insure full employment in the world and 
to imply that monetary policy did not affect real rates-would  interest 
rates and exchange rates have moved as much as they did? Masson 
and Knight conclude that much of the movement is consistent with an 
equilibrium story. Even if  their conclusion is correct, it does not log- 
ically follow that disequilibrium effects have been unimportant; but it 
gives us some insights as to the potential importance of the equilibrium 
factors. I like the strategy, but I have enough reservations about the 
execution that I am somewhat skeptical of the conclusions. 
Their paper has two parts. The first is a useful review of the channels 
through which the fiscal mix affects interest rates and exchange rates 
in the world. The second is the estimation and simulation of  a world 
model. I shall discuss both of them in turn. 
The Fiscal Mix, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates 
We now have a fairly good understanding of the way the world fiscal 
mix affects interest rates and exchange rates through equilibrium chan- 
nels. But the theory ends up with question marks on the signs of many 
of the effects, and this is precisely where an empirical effort, such as 
the one presented in  the paper, can be useful. Careful empirical esti- 
mates may  allow us  to  sign some of these theoretically  ambiguous 
effects. Let me therefore briefly review the main channels that have 
been identified, with a particular emphasis on the question marks. 
Let us think of two “countries,”  the United States and the rest of 
the world, ROW, and consider the effects of a U.S. fiscal expansion 
under flexible prices. Let us start with the short-run effects. A U.S. 
fiscal expansion increases the U.S. demand and thus the world demand 
for goods, putting pressure on interest rates; the world interest rate 
therefore increases.  In addition, the relative demand for U.S. goods 
most likely increases, leading to an increase in their relative price, a 
real U.S. dollar appreciation. Using figure 2.5 from the paper (which 
itself reproduces that in Dornbusch [  1983]), and denoting ROW vari- 
ables with asterisks, the U.S. goods market equilibrium locus is given 
by GG, and the ROW equilibrium locus by GG‘.  A US.  fiscal expan- 
sion increases demand, increasing the interest rate r at any exchange 63  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
r* 
e 
Fig. 2.5  Fiscal policy, interest, and exchange rates 
rate, and shifting GG to G%'.  Under interest arbitrage r  = r*, this 
shift leads to lower e and higher r and r*. So far so good and the effects 
are unambiguous. 
In the medium and the long term, four stock-flow effects come into 
action.' The first is the increase in U.S. public debt, due to the accu- 
mulation of deficits. Like the initial deficits, this increases world de- 
mand and the relative demand for U.S. goods, leading to further pres- 
sure on interest rates and the dollar. 
The second is the transfer of wealth implied by the current account 
deficit of the U.S. from the U.S. to the ROW. This transfer decreases 
U.S. wealth relative to ROW wealth, decreasing the relative demand 
for U.S. goods and thus leading to dollar depreciation. In figure 2.5, 
GG moves from G'G' back to the right, while G'G' moves to the left. 
The impact on interest rates is ambiguous. 
The third effect comes from capital accumulation. The initial increase 
in interest rates leads to a slowdown in capital accumulation over time, 
further reducing supply in  both  countries. This is likely to further 
increase interest rates but has ambiguous effects on the exchange rate. 
The fourth effect arises from the increase in the proportion of  US. 
debt in portfolios. If  U.S. and foreign debt are not perfect substitutes, 
such an increase will require an increase in the premium on U.S. debt. 
The effect on interest rates and exchange rates can also be analyzed 
using figure 2.5. Starting from point A, consider an increase in the U.S. 
debt to ROW debt ratio, which requires an increase in the premium of 
h. The new equilibrium, in which r = r* + h is given by points C and 
D. The U.S. interest rate is higher, the ROW rate lower, and the dollar 
depreciates. The Masson-Knight paper ignores this effect and is prob- 
1. Sachs and Wyplosz (1984) focus on these aspects. 64  Malcolm D. Knight/Paul R.  Masson 
ably right in doing so, given the lack of empirical success in isolating 
it. 
To summarize, while short-run effects are fairly unambiguous, me- 
dium- and long-run effects, especially on the exchange rate front, are 
much  less so.* What  are the crucial  determinants  of  the  signs and 
magnitudes of these medium- and long-run effects? The main one is 
the degree to which fiscal policy affects demand in the first place, or 
equivalently the degree of non-neutrality of deficits and debt. For the 
rest, it depends on whether one focuses on interest rates or exchange 
rates, the medium or the long run. For long-run interest rate effects, 
for example, the central parameters are clearly the interest elasticities 
of  wealth supply and capital demand. With this in mind, let us look at 
the empirical model estimated by Masson and Knight. 
Empirical estimates 
Obviously, Masson and Knight cannot build a large empirical model. 
They build a simple model with three equations for each country: an 
investment equation, a savings equation, and a trade balance equation. 
I have no quarrel with this choice. 
They then use and estimate simple linear specifications which, ig- 
noring disequilibrium terms, relate the savings income ratio to the wealth 
income ratio and the interest rate, and the investment output ratio to 
the capital output ratio and the interest rate. Anybody who has esti- 
mated either consumption or investment functions will be skeptical of 
the ability of such specifications to capture interest elasticities of wealth 
and capital accurately; the difficulties of finding either an effect of user 
cost-let  alone of the interest rate-on investment or of  the interest 
rate on savings are well documented. And the results of the paper will 
do little to reassure the skeptics. I shall limit myself to two examples: 
The estimated interest elasticity of  savings is negative3; this in turn 
implies a negative interest elasticity of wealth. It is a result with strong 
implications for their simulations as it implies very large movements 
of  interest  rates in  response  to deficits.  This negative  elasticity is, 
despite what the authors state, a result which is at sharp variance with 
theory. Summers (1981) has shown that the often heard statement that 
income and substitution effects of interest rate changes on savings can 
easily cancel is  only appropriate in  models in  which  people receive 
labor income on the first day of their working life. In models with more 
2. With forward-looking expectations, the ambiguity about the medium and long runs 
may well carry over to the short run. But the paper stays clear of that issue. 
3. The logic behind constraining the coefficient on interest rates to be the same across 
countries is not compelling. Either the countries are the same, in which case all coef- 
ficients should be constrained to be identical, or they are not, in which case it is difficult 
to see why this would affect all coefficients except this one. 65  Fiscal Policies, Net Saving, and Real Exchange Rates 
realistic  life cycle  assumptions,  the wealth  elasticity is likely to be 
positive, even if the elasticity of  substitution between consumption at 
different points in time is very low. 
The estimated investment equation, say for the US.,  implies that 
an increase in the real rate from 5 to 10% decreases the ratio of in- 
vestment to GNP by  1%  and decreases the capital output ratio ulti- 
mately by 8%. Is this reasonable? If  we assumed Cobb Douglas pro- 
duction, which is often thought to be a decent approximation to the 
long-run production function, and a depreciation rate of lo%, the de- 
crease in the capital output ratio in response to this doubling of  the 
real rate would be of 33%. Here again, their estimates of the interest 
elasticity of capital imply substantially more movement in interest rates 
than what theory would predict.  Indeed, for all three countries, the 
interest elasticity of  net  savings (savings minus investment) appears 
not to be significantly different from zero.4 
The arguments above suggest that the model overestimates the effect 
of a given increase in aggregate demand on interest rates. At the same 
time, it may well be that the model underestimates the effect of fiscal 
policy on demand. This is because it treats +, the degree to which debt 
is net wealth as given and constant throughout; but theory  suggests 
that this is unlikely to be true. Debt is surely much more net wealth if 
agents anticipate not to repay taxes during their lifetime than if they 
anticipate a sharp increase in taxes in the near future. Gramm-Rudman 
has surely decreased + drastically, and this was indeed reflected right 
away in interest rates and exchange rates. But + may still be much 
higher than in the 1970s, and higher than the sample estimate of  .42 
given in the table. 
Within their strategy, what could Masson and Knight have done? I 
think they  should have asked less of  their data and relied  more on 
theory and estimates obtained by others using better data sets and 
better specifications. The exact mix of specification, estimation, and 
theft is largely a matter of taste. I would, for example, have specified 
the investment function by forcing it to imply a reasonable long-run 
production function-say  Cobb Douglas-and  letting the data deter- 
mine only the process of adjustment, which they can do quite accu- 
rately. I would have relied on a tighter  specification of  consumption 
such as that used  and estimated by  Hayashi (1982), which has well 
understood steady-state implications. This would surely not resolve all 
difficulties; the unfortunate fact is that we do not know much about 
the interest elasticity of wealth-probably  not enough to give a precise 
answer to the question asked in this paper. 
4. To  be sure that this was the case, one would need to  know the covariance of the 
estimates of  the two elasticities, which is not reported in the paper. 66  Malcolm D. KnighUWul R. Masson 
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Comment  Rudiger Dornbusch 
This paper proposes an ambitious task: the empirical implementation 
of  a modern,  micro-based  saving and investment approach  to trade 
imbalances  and  the  real  exchange  rate.  This  interpretation  of  the 
Mundell-Flemming paradigm  in  new  clothes, while well-established 
from countless discussions in the past three years and known in Wash- 
ington as the Feldstein doctrine, is in fact quite difficult. Any model 
based on an uncompromising approach to microeconomic foundations 
must cast the forward-looking, tax-paying household in a multi-country 
setting. The paper does not quite come to grips with this hard task- 
all the language is right, but the equations are neither of the new clas- 
sical kind, nor quite the old Keynesian ones. Both camps thus are left 
with their appetites whetted and their bellies half-empty and rumbling. 
But even if  the particular channels of transmission and their stability 
remain open to question, the paper offers important empirical evidence 
which, along with recent work by Hutchinson and Throop (1985) and 
Feldstein (1986), highlights the impact of budget deficits on real ex- 
change rates. 
The Issue 
The basic proposition  of  the paper is  that large shifts in  national 
structural budgets in the past ten years, not monetary policy changes, 
explain the real appreciation of  the dollar. Table 2.8  shows the cu- 
mulative changes from 1981 to 1985 in the structural budget surpluses 
and in the red  exchange rates for the United States, Japan, and Germany. 
The explanation can easily be seen with the help of figure 2.6 (see 
Dornbusch [1983a, 83-85]).  Along ZZ the home country’s goods market 
clears: increased real interest rates depress world demand for domestic 
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Table 2.8  Structural Budgets and Real Exchange Rates: 1981-85 
(Cumulative Percentage Change) 
Structural Budget  Real  Exchange Rate 
United States  -  3.0  21.1 
Japan  2.2  -  7.8 
Germany  3.4  -  2.0 
Source: OECD and Morgan Guaranty. 
Nore: Structural and inflation adjusted, cumulative shift in discretionary fiscal policy. 
output and therefore require, for market equilibrium, a real deprecia- 
tion.  Along Z*Z* the foreign goods market  clears.  Here higher real 
interest rates, by symmetry, require an increase in the relative price 
of domestic goods or real appreciation. A fiscal expansion at home, 
assuming that it falls entirely on domestic goods, shifts ZZ up and to 
the left, leading to a new equilibrium at E' with higher world interest 
rates and a real appreciation of the home country's currency. It is worth 
recording that this 1983 analysis interpreted both the dollar appreciation 
and anticipated the dollar decline that would come with prospective 
fiscal consolidation. I noted at the time: 
These prospective changes in interest rates and exchange rates (due 
to an anticipated fiscal expansion) are anticipated under rational ex- 
pectations and show up in higher long-term real interest rates and in 
dollar appreciation. The forward-looking nature of assets markets, 
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correct, a move toward smaller long-run, not cyclical, deficits would 
lead to a collapse of the dollar. The analysis emphasizes the peculiar 
and central effects of fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates. 
Theory 
At the theoretical level there are several objections to the Knight- 
Masson analysis. These objectives invalidate the claim that this analysis 
offers an implementation of the modern approach. 
There is a lack of  integration  of  the trade  sector and the savings- 
investment sector. While the savings-investment equations are based 
on intertemporal optimization considerations, the trade equations are 
of the most orthodox variety, with real exchange rates, a time trend, 
and cyclical variables determining trade flows. There is no appearance 
here at all of wealth, budget deficit spillovers, or real interest rates. 
Of  course, that does not make sense since the same household that 
reduces demand for domestic goods in response to increased interest 
rates will also ordinarily reduce demand for imports. The same ar- 
gument applies to the impact of changes in investment spending on 
trade flows. The failure to carry the optimizing considerations over 
to the critical trade block has bearing on the interpretation  of the 
empirical findings. 
The treatment of the wealth implications of fiscal policy is entirely 
inappropriate.  The Barro-Blanchard mortal  taxpayer  is concerned 
with the exact timing offuture taxes. The current stock of debt and 
the  current  budget  deficit are not  sufficient statistics to judge the 
impact of fiscal policy. It is the essence of the modern approach that 
the public should look forward  to ask whether they themselves or 
someone else will  pay  the prospective  taxes.  Will  Kemp-Roth be 
followed on the heels by a Gramm-Rudman or is fiscal consolidation 
sufficiently remote for the average taxpayer to discount future con- 
solidation at high rates? 
This is highly relevant for the empirical analysis: even as the struc- 
tural deficit is widening, the household already retrenches, contrary 
to Knight-Masson, because  of  a  shift toward fiscal consolidation. 
Knight-Masson recognize the problem in note seven of their text, but 
their own presentation highlights the limitations of the analysis carried 
in the main body of the paper. The forward-looking variables simply 
cannot be modeled as constants when major shifts in the future tax 
and spending profile occur. 
There is no regard for the demand implications of the budget. Does 
a dollar of investment tax credits have the same impact on current 
demand for domestic goods as a dollar of defense spending or a dollar 
of estate taxes? Large econometric models of Keynesian persuasion 
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The forward-looking taxpayer asset-holder has little scope for action 
in  the Masson-Knight model. At the end of  1984, US.  national net 
worth amounted to $1  1,700 billion and the public debt outstanding 
was about $1,000 billion. This suggests that the role of other assets, 
specifically the value of the capital stock, should be central to the 
analysis. A good week on the stock market, after all, has more of an 
impact on wealth than a full year of deficits. This point simply cannot 
be neglected.  Empirically it implies that the capital stock cannot be 
carried at replacement cost but must be carried at market value to 
capture the impact of valuation on saving and investment.' 
The treatment of interest rates is inappropriate. In an intertemporal 
context where relative prices appear, distinction between permanent 
and transitory changes in real interest rates is necessary. In a country 
where deficits have led to real appreciation, there is an expectation 
of real depreciation and hence real interest rates are perceived by 
households as being high. The converse is true for the country that 
is lending. On the investment side this point is important since the 
real user cost of capital may be affected by terms of trade changes.2 
The Central Empirical Issue 
The overriding objection to the empirical implementation arises from 
the introduction of cyclical variables in the saving and investment equa- 
tion, In the theoretical section, without any justification in terms of the 
underlying microeconomic theory, saving is made a function of current 
real GNP, as is the desired stock of capital and hence investment. This 
formulation implies that in the actual equations for saving and invest- 
ment the variable GAP appears as an explanatory variable. In the same 
manner, inclusion of  the actual deficit as a regressor introduces an 
endogenous cyclical variable in place of the theoretically more appro- 
priate cyclically adjusted deficit. 
The uncompromising microeconomic approach has no room for such 
a formulation. The forward-looking household bases saving decisions 
on the relation between actual assets relative to the present value of 
human wealth. Of course, the present value of human wealth and cur- 
rent real GNP are not the same. Likewise, investment decisions of the 
optimizing capital-user and the investment producing industries, in a 
context of adjustment costs, are based  on the structural parameters 
characterizing technology and on the perspective cost of capital, not 
on output. By assumption these firms are price takers. If demand were 
to matter, a model of imperfect competition would need to be offered 
1.  See, for example, Blanchard (1981) and Dornbusch and Dantas (1984). 
2. See Obstfeld (1983), Svensson and Razin  (1985). and Dornbusch (1985a,  1985b, 
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and there is simply no question that the path of  future demand, not 
current output, would be the relevant explanatory variable. 
It is well-known that empirically cyclical variables do more of the 
work than they should be doing by the standards of uncompromising 
microeconomic appro ache^.^ Liquidity constraints and accelerator ef- 
fects provide an explanation. These effects, one must assume, provide 
significance in the Knight-Masson estimations. Therefore it is entirely 
inappropriate to read  the evidence as a test  of  an uncompromising 
microeconomic approach.  The results are a faithful rendition  of the 
standard Keynesian model. There appears to be no recognition of this 
issue in the Knight-Masson analysis. 
Concluding Remarks 
The Knight-Masson paper is an ambitious, welcome addition to the 
empirical literature on open economy macroeconomics. That literature 
remains scarce, imperfect, and easy to take issue with. Criticism at 
this stage is unavoidable but also altogether appropriate for two rea- 
sons. First it identifies what exactly we know and sharpens the debate. 
Second, by contrasting alternative paradigms, it is quite obvious that, 
for the time being, the uncompromising microeconomic approach (even 
with the Blanchard Amendment) remains at best a promising research 
agenda, but most assuredly does not command a shred of  empirical 
evidence in its support. 
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